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A non-governmental organization (NGO) can make a non-contractible investment
to provide a public good. Only ownership can be specied ex ante, so ex post
e¢ ciency requires reaching an agreement with the government. Besley and Ghatak
(2001) argue that the party with the larger valuation should be the owner. We
show that when transaction costs have to be incurred before the bargaining stage
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nding also contrasts with the standard private-good
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1 Introduction
The property rights approach based on incomplete contracts, developed by Oliver
Hart and his coauthors (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart,
1995), is widely regarded as a major advance in economic theory.1 Originally, the
property rights approach was concerned with optimal ownership arrangements in
private-good contexts. Besley and Ghatak (2001) have applied the approach to
discuss who should be the owner in public-good settings. In the present paper,
we extend their framework in order to study the implications of transaction costs
that may restrain ex post negotiations.
Specically, consider two parties who both care about the benets of a public
good, say the government and a non-governmental organization (NGO).2 At the
outset, the parties can only specify an ownership structure. Subsequently, the
NGO has to make a non-contractible investment. After the investment is sunk,
provision of the public good becomes contractible, and the parties can bargain
with each other. Ownership improves a partys bargaining position and hence
inuences the incentives to invest. In the private-good context studied by Hart
and his coauthors, when only one party has to make an investment decision, then
this party should always be the owner. In contrast, Besley and Ghatak (2001)
argue that in a public-good context, the party who has the larger valuation of the
public good should be the owner.
The property rights approach has been criticized because it assumes that ex
post e¢ ciency is always achieved by Coasean bargaining (Holmström and Roberts,
1998; Williamson, 2000). In the present paper, we thus introduce transaction
costs in the most straightforward way possible, following an insightful paper by
Anderlini and Felli (2006). They argue that in order to reach a bargaining stage,
a party may rst have to incur transaction costs.3 We show that introducing
such transaction costs into Besley and Ghataks (2001) framework may overturn
their main result as well as the standard nding of the property rights theory:
ownership by the government can be optimal, even though the NGO has a larger
valuation of the public good and the NGO is the only party that has to make an
1See Nobel Prize Committee (2016) for a detailed appreciation of Harts contribution.
2As pointed out by Besley and Ghatak (2001), the two parties could also be di¤erent public
entities (say, federal and local government).
3The transaction costs may be interpreted as the time spent preparing for the negotiations.
For example, it may be necessary to conceive of a suitable language to describe the states of
nature, information about the legal environment must be collected, etc. (see Anderlini and Felli,
2006, section 2).
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investment decision.
The intuition behind our result is that the additional surplus that can be
generated in the ex post negotiations has to be su¢ ciently large for the transaction
costs to be covered. An ownership structure that yields a poor outcome in the
absence of negotiations can hence become desirable, because it makes paying the
transaction costs more attractive.
Related literature. Several authors have studied variants of Besley and Ghataks
(2001) public-good model. For instance, Francesconi and Muthoo (2011) consider
impure public goods, Halonen-Akatwijuka (2012) investigates indispensability of
agents, and Schmitz (2015) allows the ex post negotiations to break down with
a small exogenous probability.4 Yet, transaction costs as modelled by Anderlini
and Felli (2006) have not been studied in this literature so far.5
2 Model
Consider two parties, G (government) and N (NGO). At some initial date t = 0,
an ownership structure o 2 fG;Ng is determined. At date t = 1, N makes an
observable but non-contractible investment I  0.6 The public good which can
be produced with the help of Ns investment becomes contractible only after the
investment is sunk. At date t = 2, N has to decide whether to pay the transaction
cost c  0.7 A necessary condition for reaching an agreement to collaborate at
date t = 3 is that N has paid the transactions cost c. If the parties agree to
cooperate, they together provide the quantity y(I) of the public good, where
4In Schmitz (2015), the optimal ownership structure looks more like the one in the standard
property rights model (Hart, 1995). In particular, in his model it can never happen that own-
ership by the government is optimal when only the NGO invests and the NGO has a larger
valuation of the public good.
5Transaction costs in the spirit of Anderlini and Felli (2006) have recently also been studied
by Müller and Schmitz (2016) in a property rights model with private goods and by Anderlini
et al. (2016) in the context of pre-trial agreements.
6The model can be extended to the case in which both parties invest. Focusing on the case of
one-sided investments only strengthens our main result, because in a standard property rights
model (cf. Hart, 1995), N -ownership would always be optimal if only N invests.
7One can extend the model such that also G has to pay a transaction cost in order to reach
the bargaining stage. Anderlini and Felli (2006) show that the implications of transaction costs
are most interesting when there is a mismatchbetween the distributions of the transaction
costs and the partiesbargaining powers. Following Besley and Ghatak (2001) we will assume
that both parties have the same bargaining power, hence we focus on the simplest case with
asymmetric transaction costs.
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y(0) = 0, y0(I) > 0, y0(0) =1, limI!1 y0(I) = 0, and y00(I) < 0.
If c has not been paid or if c has been paid but the parties do not reach an
agreement to cooperate, the quantity of the public good provided under ownership
structure o 2 fG;Ng is oy(I), where 0 < G < N < 1. Thus, if cooperation
fails such that the other partys human capital is missing, the owner can only
produce a fraction of the quantity that would be feasible under cooperation; i.e.,
cooperation is always ex post e¢ cient. Note that since N is the investing party,
in the absence of collaboration the investment can be used more e¤ectively when
N is the owner.
The valuation of party i 2 fG;Ng for the public good is given by i > 0.
The partiesdate-3 payo¤s are summarized in Table 1, where T denotes a transfer
payment from N to G.
Payo¤ of party G Payo¤ of party N
Collaboration Gy(I) + T Ny(I)  T
Default, o = G GGy(I) NGy(I)
Default, o = N GNy(I) NNy(I)
Table 1. The partiesdate-3 payo¤s.
To avoid uninteresting case distinctions, in the analysis we focus on G > ~G,
where
~G :=

2(N   G)
1  G   1

N : (1)
Note that ~G < N ; i.e., Gs valuation can be smaller or larger thanNs valuation.8
3 Analysis
3.1 Ex post division of surplus (t = 3)
Following Besley and Ghatak (2001), we assume that if negotiations are feasible
at date t = 3, then the outcome is given by the regular Nash bargaining solution.9
Hence, if N paid the transaction costs at date t = 2, the parties always collaborate
at date t = 3 and agree on a transfer payment T such that each party receives its
8We focus on G > ~G only to shorten the exposition. Note that in the example illustrated
in Figure 1 below, we do not impose this parameter restriction.
9See Muthoo (1999) for an excellent exposition of bargaining theory.
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default payo¤ plus half of the renegotiation surplus (i.e., the additional surplus
that is generated by collaboration). If N did not pay the transaction costs, such
that negotiations cannot take place, each party receives its default payo¤. Thus,
at date t = 3 the partiespayo¤s are
No (I) =
(
No (I) :=

No +
1
2
(N + G)(1  o)

y(I) if c was paid,
No (I) := Noy(I) if c was not paid,
(2)
Go (I) =
(
Go (I) :=

Go +
1
2
(N + G)(1  o)

y(I) if c was paid,
Go (I) := Goy(I) if c was not paid.
(3)
3.2 Payment of transaction costs (t = 2)
At date t = 2, N is willing to pay the transaction costs under ownership structure
o 2 fG;Ng whenever No (I)   c  No (I), that is, whenever Ns share of the
renegotiation surplus covers the transaction costs. This requires Ns investment
at the prior stage to be su¢ ciently large,
I  y 1

2c
(N + G)(1  o)

=: ~Io; (4)
where y 1 denotes the inverse of y. Since y 1 is strictly increasing, ~IN  ~IG holds.
Intuitively, as each partys default payo¤ for a given investment I is larger under
o = N than under o = G, the renegotiation surplus is smaller under o = N .
Therefore, the minimum investment necessary for the transaction costs to be
covered by Ns share of the renegotiation surplus is higher under o = N .
3.3 Investment incentives (t = 1)
The ex ante payo¤ of N when investing I  0 reads
No (I) =
(

N
o (I) := 
N
o (I)  c  I if I  ~Io;
No (I) := 
N
o (I)  I if I < ~Io;
(5)
where both 
N
o (I) and 
N
o (I) are strictly concave in I. The optimal investment
level if N were always to pay the transaction costs under o 2 fG;Ng is
Io = arg max
I0

N
o (I) = g

1
No +
1
2
(N + G)(1  o)

; (6)
where g = y0 1 denotes the inverse of y0. The optimal investment level if N were
never to pay the transaction costs under o 2 fG;Ng is
Io = arg max
I0
No (I) = g

1
No

; (7)
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where Io < Io since g
0 < 0. Note that 
N
o (Io) R No (Io) whenever c Q ~co, where
~co :=

No +
1
2
(N + G)(1  o)

y(Io)  Io   [Noy(Io)  Io] : (8)
It can be shown that c  ~co implies Io  ~Io, and c > ~co implies Io < ~Io. Hence,
the following result holds.
Lemma 1 At stage t = 1, Ns optimal investment under ownership structure
o 2 fG;Ng is given by
Io =
(
Io if c  ~co;
Io if c > ~co:
(9)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Observe that (7) implies IG < IN . Thus, if N does not pay the transaction
costs under either ownership structure, N -ownership provides higher investment
incentives than G-ownership. From (6) we obtain IG R IN whenever NG +
1
2
(N + G)(1  G) R NN + 12(N + G)(1  N), i.e. whenever G R N holds.
Hence, if N pays the transaction costs under either ownership structure, then
ownership by the high-valuation party induces larger investment incentives than
ownership by the low-valuation party. Finally, from (6) and (7) it follows that
IG > IN , since by assumption G > ~G. Thus, if N pays the transaction costs
under G-ownership but not under N -ownership, then G-ownership provides larger
investment incentives. Therefore, the following result holds.
Lemma 2 The investment levels can be ranked as follows:
(i) If G  N , then IG < IN < IG  IN .
(ii) If N < G, then IG < IN < IN < IG.
3.4 Optimal ownership structure (t = 0)
We can now analyze which ownership structure maximizes the total surplus. De-
ne
S(I) := (N + G)y(I)  c  I (10)
and
So(I) := (N + G)oy(I)  I; (11)
where both S(I) and So(I) are strictly concave functions of I. Total surplus under
ownership structure o 2 fG;Ng is given by
So =
(
S(Io) if c  ~co;
So(Io) if c > ~co:
(12)
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First, suppose that transaction costs are so small that cooperation takes place
irrespective of the ownership structure, c < minf~cG; ~cNg. In this case, So =
S(Io) for o 2 fG;Ng. Note that g0 < 0 and (6) imply that there is always
underinvestment with regard to the benchmark I
S
= arg maxI0 S(I) = g( 1N+G ).
Strict concavity of S(I) then implies that S(IG) R S(IN) whenever IG R IN .
Thus, by Lemma 2, it is optimal that the party with the higher valuation is the
owner.
Second, suppose that transaction costs are so large that cooperation does not
take place under either ownership structure, c > maxf~cG; ~cNg. Hence, So = So(Io)
for o 2 fG;Ng. With ISo = arg maxI0 S(I) = g( 1(N+G)o ) and g0 < 0, (7)
implies that Io < I
S
o for o = fG;Ng. Thus, SG(IG) < SN(IG) < SN(IN),
where the rst inequality holds since G < N and the second inequality follows
from IG < IN < I
S
N . Hence, N -ownership is optimal, because N -ownership not
only induces stronger investment incentives than G-ownership, but also leads to
a smaller loss due to foregone cooperation.
Third, suppose that N pays the transaction costs under one ownership struc-
ture but not under the other ownership structure; i.e., ~co^ < c  ~co for o; o^ 2 fG;Ng
with o 6= o^. According to Lemma 2, Ns investment is larger under ownership
structure o than under under ownership structure o^. Whether this larger invest-
ment also translates into higher surplus, however, depends on the transaction
costs, which N pays under o-ownership but not under o^-ownership. Specically,
S(Io) > S o^(I o^) whenever c < c
S
o;o^, where
cSo;o^ := (N + G)y(Io)  Io   [(N + G)o^y(I o^)  I o^]: (13)
The following proposition summarizes the three cases.10
Proposition 1 (i) If c < minf~cG; ~cNg, then N-ownership is optimal when
G < N and G-ownership is optimal when G > N .
(ii) If c > maxf~cG; ~cNg, then N-ownership is optimal.
(iii) If ~co^ < c < ~co for o; o^ 2 fG;Ng and o 6= o^, then o^-ownership is optimal
when c > cSo;o^ and o-ownership is optimal when c < c
S
o;o^.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 1.11
10For brevity, we neglect knife-edge cases where both ownership structures result in identical
surplus.
11In the gure, y(I) =
p
I, N = :8, G = :4, and N = 1. The gure depicts how the optimal
ownership structure depends on the governments valuation G and the transaction costs c.
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Part (i) corresponds to the result that Besley and Ghatak (2001) obtained in
the absence of transaction costs (c = 0). If c is su¢ ciently small, then ownership
should go to the party that has the larger valuation of the public good.
Part (ii) shows that if the transaction costs are prohibitively large, such that
negotiations never take place, then ownership by the investing party (i.e., N -
ownership) is optimal, just as in the standard property rights model with private
goods (Hart, 1995).
Part (iii) allows for the main novel nding of the present paper. G-ownership
can be optimal even when G < N , despite the fact that only N invests. The
reason is that ceteris paribus under G-ownership the default payo¤s are smaller
and thus more can be gained in the ex post negotiations. Hence, paying the
transaction costs is more attractive under o = G. Indeed, the following result
shows that if G is only slightly smaller than N , there are always levels of c such
that G-ownership is optimal.
Corollary 1 There exists " > 0 such that for G 2 (N   "; N + ") we have
~cN < minf~cG; cSG;Ng. If ~cN < c < minf~cG; cSG;Ng, then G-ownership is optimal.
Proof: See Appendix B.
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Figure 1. The optimal ownership structure.
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4 Conclusion
We have explored the optimal ownership structure in a public-good setting in
the spirit of Besley and Ghatak (2001). In the presence of transaction costs (as
modelled by Anderlini and Felli, 2006), it may be optimal that the government is
the owner, even when the NGO is the only party that has to make an investment
decision and the NGO is the party that has a larger valuation of the public good.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. Comparing (4) with (6) reveals that ~Io  Io whenever c  co,
where
co :=
1
2
(N + G)(1  o)y(Io): (14)
From (8) and (14) it follows that
~co < co , y(Io)  y(Io)
Io   Io
<
1
No
; (15)
where the latter inequality holds because y0(Io) =
1
No
and y00 < 0.
Comparing (4) with (7) shows that ~Io  Io whenever c  co, where
co :=
1
2
(N + G)(1  o)y(Io): (16)
From (8) and (16) it follows that
~co > co ,
y(Io)  y(Io)
Io   Io
>
1
No +
1
2
(N + G)(1  o) ; (17)
where the latter inequality holds since y0(Io) = 1No+ 12 (N+G)(1 o)
and y00 < 0.
Thus, co < ~co < co. In consequence, if c  ~co, then investing I = Io at date
t = 1 leads to N paying c at date t = 2, such that investing I = Io maximizes
No (I). Likewise, if c > ~co, then investing I = Io at date t = 1 leads to N not
paying c at date t = 2, such that investing I = Io maximizes 
N
o (I). 
Appendix B
Proof of Corollary 1. For G = N we have ~cojG=N = H(o), where
H() := Ny

g

1
N

  g

1
N

 

Ny

g

1
N

  g

1
N

: (18)
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As
dH()
d
=  Ny

g

1
N

< 0; (19)
we have ~cGjG=N > ~cN jG=N . Hence, by continuity of ~cG and ~cN in G, for G
su¢ ciently close to N we have ~cG > ~cN . Moreover, comparison of (8) and (13)
reveals that cSG;N jG=N > ~cN jG=N whenever
F (N) := y

g

1
N

  Ny

g

1
NN

> 0: (20)
Condition (20) is indeed satised for all N 2 (0; 1), because F (1) = 0 and
F 0(N) =  

y

g

1
NN

  1
2N
2
N
g0

1
NN

< 0: (21)
Thus, by continuity of ~cG, ~cN , and cSG;N in G, there exists " > 0 such that
~cN < minf~cG; cSG;Ng for G 2 (N   "; N + "). As a consequence, there exist
transaction costs c 2 (~cN ;minf~cG; cSG;Ng) such that according to Proposition 1(iii)
the surplus is strictly larger under G-ownership than under N -ownership. 
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